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Abstract
In the light of recent discussions we present the main results of our
project, the aim of which was to derive a Bell-type inequality from the
weakest possible assumptions. A principal outcome of the project is that
a Bell-type inequality can be derived from the assumption of separate
common causes (Graßhoff, Portmann and Wu¨thrich 2005), even with-
out the assumption of perfectly anticorrelating event types (Portmann
and Wu¨thrich 2007). We also address the critique that in Graßhoff et al.
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1 Introduction
Bell-type inequalities provide predictions of observable frequencies of measure-
ment outcomes in a particular experiment in quantum mechanics (the EPR-
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Bohm experiment). Although the actual experiments were conducted with po-
larized photons, for our purposes we can consider the Bell inequalities as having
being tested in the familiar setup proposed by Bohm and Aharonov (1957),
which is based on Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen’s original formulation of the
paradox that bears their names (EPR) (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935).
We will refer to the experimental setup described by Bohm as the EPRB exper-
iment.
In the EPRB experiment the particles of a pair in the spin singlet state
are separated from each other by an arbitrary distance. We assume that one
particle flies into the left wing of the experimental setting, the other particle
into the right wing. Each particle’s spin is measured relative to one of three
directions. The individual particle measurements yield an apparently random
sequence of results that are either “spin up” or “spin down” relative to the chosen
measurement direction. A comparison of measurement results when parallel
measurement settings are chosen shows a perfect (anti)correlation between the
outcome of the measurement performed on the left particle and the outcome of
the measurement performed on the right particle.
The assumption that the correlations require a local causal explanation leads
to predictions (a Bell inequality) that contradict quantum mechanics as well
as, by current standards, the experimental data. Thus, at least one of the
assumptions needed to derive a Bell inequality must be wrong.
The argument has the form of a reductio ad absurdum: from the falsity of
the conclusion, the falsity of one of the premises is inferred. The strength of the
argument rests on the fact that:
• the derivation is deductive;
• all the assumptions are explicit; and
• the set of assumptions is minimal
in the sense that no subset of the assumptions implies a Bell inequality. Since
derivations of Bell-type inequalities are often invoked as arguments against the
causal closedness of the physical world, the derivation should above all suppose
a notion of causal explanation that is “non-trivial” and “as weak as possible”
(van Fraassen 1982, p. 27).
2 Common causes for correlated events
The event types that are observed to be correlated in a EPRB experiment are
assumed, justifiably, not to stand in a direct causal relation. If we are to explain
the correlations at all, we have to do so by postulating a common cause for the
correlated effects. Most derivations, lacking as they do a sound theory of causal
relevance, resort to Reichenbach’s common-cause principle (Reichenbach 1956)
providing a seemingly necessary condition for causal relevance (screening-off ).
The principle states that, conditional upon the instantiation of the common
cause, the events in question are uncorrelated. This statistical condition is
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weaker than the demand that the common cause be sufficient for its effects, but
it still captures the idea that, with the exception of the common cause, there is
no reason for the event types to be correlated.
As Reichenbach explicated the screening-off condition only with reference to
one pair of correlated events, it is not clear how one should apply this principle
to the EPRB setup (cf. Hofer-Szabo´, Re´dei and Szabo´ 1999). Traditional deriva-
tions assume that there is a common common cause for all correlated pairs of
events and, therefore, a common screener-off :
p(L+R−|MiNiC) = p(L+|MiNiC)p(R−|MiNiC) ∀i.
This, however, is still an unjustifiably strong assumption. Nothing in Reichen-
bach’s notion of common causes dictates that the common cause should be
common to all correlated pairs. A more general application of Reichenbach’s
condition only demands that, for each correlated pair, there is a (possibly dif-
ferent) common cause. From the assumption of separate common causes, only
the following screening-off condition can be justified:
p(L+R−|MiNiCii) = p(L+|MiNiCii)p(R−|MiNiCii),
where the common causes C are indexed as being the cause of the measurement
outcomes of a specific choice of measurement directions.
The C indices express neither a causal nor a statistical dependence between
the common causes and the measurement operations. They are simply labels
to distinguish between types of events (at the source where the particles are
created). The distinguished event types at the particle source are not mutually
exclusive descriptions of a “total state”. A common cause responsible for a
correlation exhibited by a certain measurement need not occur together with
the corresponding measurement. All that is required is that the screening-
off conditions hold for the common causes with respect to the measurement
results. The common causes may or may not be instantiated in each run of
the experiment, irrespective of which measurement event type is chosen to be
instantiated. Separate common causes need not be causally relevant to the
choice of measurements nor is a causal influence backwards in time from the
measurement choices on the common causes required.
3 A common screener-off is not a common com-
mon cause
Hofer-Szabo´ et al. (1999) claim that without the unjustified strong assumption,
made by traditional derivations, of a common common cause “Bell’s inequality
cannot be derived” (p. 388, emph. in the original). Graßhoff et al. (2005) proved
the contrary, supposing reasonable locality and other independence conditions.
This derivation assumes a weaker notion of common cause explanations than
traditional derivations and, therefore, provides a stronger reductio ad absurdum
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argument against the possibility of the EPRB correlations having a common
cause explanation.
One could surmise, though, that the conjunction of the separate common
causes just makes up a common common cause. But, in general, this is not the
case, since, for instance, from
p(AiBi|Ci) = p(Ai|Ci)p(Bi|Ci) (1)
and
p(AjBj |Cj) = p(Aj |Cj)p(Bj |Cj) (2)
it does not follow that
p(AiBi|CiCj) = p(Ai|CiCj)p(Bi|CiCj). (3)
Only under specific circumstances is the conjunction of separate common causes
a common screener-off. For instance, in the case of a perfect correlation between
A andB, (3) does follow from (1), as the conditional probabilities are zero or one.
Thus, in the case of perfect correlations, the conjunction of the separate common
causes is a common screener-off and, therefore (supposing Reichenbach’s notion
of common cause), could, but need not, be a common common cause (since the
Reichenbach condition is, at most, a necessary condition).
Common screener-offs, however, are not common common causes, since Re-
ichenbach took the screening-off condition to be only a necessary and not a
sufficient condition for qualifying as a common cause—and rightly so. In the
case of perfect correlations, the screener-offs are sufficient for the correlated
events (p(Ai|Ci) = 1, for instance). The conjunction of the common causes
(CiCj) is still a sufficient condition for the effects and, therefore, a (trivial)
common screener-off. But it is clear, either intuitively or given the appropriate
causal theory (Graßhoff and May 2001), that Cj (the common cause for Aj and
Bj), for instance, does not contribute to the correlations of Ai and Bi and hence
is not an appropriate part of a common cause for that correlation. Sufficient
conditions for events tend to include more than their causes. Only minimally
sufficient conditions can qualify as causes for events (Graßhoff and May 2001).
4 “Genuine” separate common causes
4.1 Relative minimality of derivations
In Graßhoff et al. (2005) we do not assume a common common cause in deriving
a Bell-type inequality. In this respect the derivation is weaker than traditional
derivations. However, in a different respect, Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt’s
(1969) derivation, for instance, is weaker: it is not assumed, in the case of
parallel measurement settings, that the outcomes are perfectly anticorrelated;
on the cost that they require a common common cause. The minimality of the
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set of assumptions of Graßhoff et al. (2005) is, therefore, only relative to the
group of derivations that do not assume perfect anticorrelations. A derivation
of a Bell-type inequality from separate common causes without the assumption
of perfect anticorrelations was published in April 2006 as an electronic preprint
before being published in print (Portmann and Wu¨thrich 2007). A similar
derivation is forthcoming (in Hofer-Szabo´ forthcoming).
In Portmann and Wu¨thrich (2007) a small deviation from perfect anticor-
relation was allowed, as for instance: p(L+|R−MiNi) = 1 − . Together with
the assumption of separate common causes (and traditional locality and inde-
pendence assumptions), an inequality was derived that is of the same form as
the Clauser-Horne inequality (Clauser and Horne 1974) but less restrictive by
essentially the amount . Quantum mechanical predictions contradict the pre-
dictions of a common-cause model obeying the assumptions of Portmann and
Wu¨thrich (2007) for  ≤ 2.689 · 10−5. It is, however, extremely difficult to ob-
tain such high precision in experiments confirming perfect anticorrelation, but
only then is the inequality violated by the quantum mechanical predictions and
experimental data. Thus, common-cause models obeying the assumptions of
Portmann and Wu¨thrich (2007) can hardly be ruled out by empirical data.
There are, however, theoretical reasons for opposing the possibility of such
a common-cause model. If the model is not to be dismissed by the violation of
the inequality derived by Portmann and Wu¨thrich (2007), the deviation from
perfect anticorrelation should be greater than 2.689 · 10−5. Yet, the theoretical
predictions of a deviation from perfect anticorrelation by, for instance, quantum
gravity effects, are much smaller. Thus, current theories, which, contrary to
standard quantum mechanics, predict a slight deviation from perfect anticorre-
lations, would hardly be able to explain a deviation by the required amount.
A further proviso is in order: it is an open question whether even the original
(more restrictive) Clauser-Horne inequality can be derived from the assumptions
of Portmann and Wu¨thrich (2007). In that case common-cause models obey-
ing the assumptions of Portmann and Wu¨thrich (2007) would be ruled out by
an empirical falsification of the Clauser-Horne inequality—as are the models
considered by these authors (Clauser and Horne 1974).
4.2 “Genuine” separate screener-offs
Only when deviations from the perfect anticorrelations (PCORR) postulated by
quantum mechanics are allowed is the conjunction of the separate screener-offs
not a common screener-off. For Hofer-Szabo´ (forthcoming) only then are there
no “implicit” common screener-offs (C-SCR), and only such derivations can
provide a derivation of Bell’s inequality from “genuine” separate screener-offs (S-
SCR). But also Graßhoff et al.’s (2005) derivation is a conclusive derivation of a
Bell inequality (BELL) from separate screener-offs (and from separate common
causes). The fact that, in the case of perfect correlations, the existence of a
common screener-off is implied by the existence of separate screener-offs does
not invalidate the statement that (together with PCORR and other assumptions
X) Bell’s inequality follows from the assumption of separate screener-offs. If only
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separate common causes, the conjunction of which is not a common screener-off,
counted as “genuine”, then there would be no genuine separate common causes
for perfect correlations.
Graßhoff et al. (2005) contains the statement that S-SCR, PCORR and X
implies BELL:
S-SCR, PCORR, X→ BELL. (4)
From traditional derivations it is known that
C-SCR, PCORR, X→ BELL. (5)
Hofer-Szabo´ (forthcoming) grounds his critique on the fact that
S-SCR, PCORR→ C-SCR. (6)
However, the (granted) truth of this statement does not invalidate Graßhoff
et al.’s (2005) claimed implication (4). Thus, in that respect (quite apart from
the non-identity of common causes and screener-offs discussed above) Hofer-
Szabo´’s (forthcoming) critique also does not invalidate Graßhoff et al.’s (2005)
argument.
5 Summary
Traditional derivations of Bell-type inequalities assume, without sound justifica-
tion, a common cause that is identical for all correlated pairs of events. However,
a Bell-type inequality can also be derived from the weaker assumption that, for
each correlated pair, there is a (possibly different) common cause. The resulting
set of assumptions, one of which by reductio ad absurdum must be false, may
or may not include the assumption of perfect anticorrelation with parallel mea-
surement settings (Graßhoff et al. 2005, Portmann and Wu¨thrich 2007). The
proof that a Bell-type inequality can be derived from separate common causes
has been conjectured to be impossible (Hofer-Szabo´ et al. 1999, p. 388), but
the argument is not invalidated by the mathematical construction of a common
screener-off from the separate common causes, contrary to what, we read, is
claimed in Hofer-Szabo´ (forthcoming).
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